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### DeepFake Disrupter: The Detector of DeepFake Is My Friend

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#### Abstract

In recent years, with the advances of generative models, many powerful face manipulation systems have been developed based on Deep Neural Networks (DNNs), called DeepFakes. If DeepFakes are not controlled timely and properly, they would become a real threat to both celebrities and ordinary people. Precautions such as adding perturbations to the source inputs will make DeepFake results look distorted from the perspective of human eyes. However, previous method doesn't explore whether the disrupted images can still spoof DeepFake detectors. This is critical for many applications where DeepFake detectors are used to discriminate between DeepFake data and real data due to the huge cost of examining a large amount of data manually. We argue that the detectors do not share a similar perspective as human eyes, which might still be spoofed by the disrupted data. Besides, the existing disruption methods rely on iteration-based perturbation generation algorithms, which is time-consuming. In this paper, we propose a novel DeepFake disruption algorithm called "DeepFake Disrupter". By training a perturbation generator, we can add the human-imperceptible perturbations to source images that need to be protected without any backpropagation update. The DeepFake results of these protected source inputs would not only look unrealistic by the human eye but also can be distinguished by DeepFake detectors easily. For example, experimental results show that by adding our trained perturbations, fake images generated by Star-GAN [3] can result in a  $10 \sim 20\%$  increase in F1-score evaluated by various DeepFake detectors.

#### 1. Introduction

Face Manipulation has raised significant concerns within
our digital society. It is a kind of technique that allows people to modify the face's identity, expression, and attributes
in a given image or video. With the development and implementation of Deep Neural Networks (DNN), the recent
manipulation methods could produce verisimilar results that
might fool human eyes. These DNN based methods, called



Figure 1. (a) shows that advanced DeepFake manipulation models can easily spoof human naked eye and DeepFake detector. (b) shows that after DeepFake Disruption, fake outputs become apparently distorted from the perspective of human eye, but can still spoof the DeepFake detector. (c) shows that our proposed method DeepFake disrupter can invalidate the DeepFake manipulation process from both human end and machine end.

DeepFakes [1,2,9,22,23,26], have attracted much attention from the public and researchers because the high-quality DeepFake results could lead to social and security problems. For example, the public might think the victims did somethings that they never did due to the presence of their identities in the DeepFake videos, thus ruining their reputations. The forgery data could also fool the security protocol by verifying the payment authorization system through fake personal information so that putting the victims' wealth at great risk.

As a response to the increasing concern of DeepFake, many defense methods are proposed. The first way is using detection models to distinguish Real and DeepFake data. Multiple detection algorithms are introduced, including using traditional DNN models for detection [5,16,19], analyzing the inconsistent within the DeepFake data [10,28], and extracting the synthesis signal as the evidence for discrimination [25]. On the other hand, recent research provides a new direction for defense, preventing attackers from synthesizing DeepFake images. These methods, called Deep-Fake Disruption, attempt to add small perturbations to the original images such that the corresponding DeepFake results might be heavily distorted in visualization. Disrupt-

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ing DeepFakes [20] is a related work on image translation
 disruption framework to make image manipulation models
 generates fake images with human-perceptible distortions.

111 Although the recent DeepFake Disruption methods could 112 prevent the DeepFake models from generating realistic re-113 sults, these kinds of methods still have some problems. In 114 the real-world multi-media systems, it is extremely expen-115 sive to employ human observers to defend the DeepFake 116 by manually examining every input image in the large vol-117 ume of vision data, even though the defects in the image 118 produced by DeepFake are obvious. Instead, to automate 119 the defense of DeepFake, it is prevalent and preferable to 120 develop DeepFake detectors. However, although the ex-121 isting disruption methods could make the DeepFake's out-122 put become distorted from the human eye, our experiment 123 demonstrates that these visually unnatural samples can still 124 spoof the DeepFake detectors since the human eye and neu-125 ral network share a different decision logic. What's more, 126 these recent disruption methods rely on iteration-based ad-127 versarial attack algorithms, e.g. Iterative Fast Gradient 128 Sign Method(I-FGSM) [8] and Projected Gradient Descent 129 (PGD) [12], to find out the perturbation for each data, which 130 is normally time-consuming. 131

We argue that we also need to consider the loss of the DeepFake detector, such that the generated DeepFake results of protected data are not only being recognized by the human eye but also can be detected by the detectors, and at the same time, the original data injected with perturbations can still be recognized as the real one. We should also use a perturbation generator to generate perturbation, which provides an end-to-end protection algorithm that can save time. Figure 1 shows the development of DeepFake disruption methods.

141 In this work, we propose a novel framework, called 142 DeepFake Disrupter, to defend against DeepFake with the 143 help of the DeepFake detector. The DeepFake Disrupter is 144 a perturbation generator that takes as input real images and 145 outputs a human-imperceptible perturbation so as to make 146 the data generated by the DeepFake models be identified 147 as fake by DeepFake detector and human eyes; meanwhile, 148 the original real inputs injected with perturbations can still 149 be identified as real by DeepFake detector. We show that 150 just making DeepFake outputs distorted from the human 151 eye's view is insufficient because the DeepFake detector 152 may still be fooled by classifying the fake videos as real. 153 Experimental results on CelebA [11] and VoxCeleb1 [14] 154 datasets demonstrate that the proposed DeepFake disrupter 155 can effectively protect original real images/videos from be-156 ing used as a source for making DeepFake data. 157

# <sup>158</sup> 2. Related Work

Adversarial attack and Adversarial Training After real izing the vulnerability of normal neural networks, a plethora

of works have been done in the area of adversarial attacks. The first work to notice about the adversarial attack would be Fast Gradient Sign Method(FGSM) proposed by [4], in which they suggest a one-step gradient ascent method to generate the adversarial examples. Based on FGSM, [12] propose Projected Gradient Descent(PGD) attacks. Instead only updating once, the Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [12] method just iteratively update the adversarial examples to make it stronger than FGSM. While the above methods collectively use the iterative gradient update method for perturbation generation, there are also some works producing perturbations via generative models. Generative Adversarial Perturbation (GAP) [17] uses U-Net and Resnet as perturbation generators to produce both universal and imagedependent perturbations that can help fool the classification networks. However, all the above works focus on adversarial attack and training on normal classification tasks and researches about adversarial attacks on generative models attract less attention. Works like [20] and [21] use the idea of adversarial attack to disrupt the ability of DeepFakes generators, which are more close to our proposed method.

DeepFake Data Generation The DeepFake techniques can be separated into two major categories, identity manipulation and attribute manipulation. For identity manipulation, RSGAN [15] extracts the embedding information of the face and hair for generating results. FSGAN [7] implement multi-scale architecture to handle different pixel situations while using an occlusion-wise algorithm to preserve the occlusion region of the target face. Li et al., [9] proposed an identity-independent DeepFake method using two network streams to extract identity and texture embedding from the source and target face separately to achieve high fidelity identity manipulation results. Facial expression and attribute manipulation form another category of DeepFake. Rather than changing the identity information, these techniques try to change some facial attributes (such as hair and skin color), or expressions (such as smiling or blinking). StarGAN [3] is a famous work for attribute manipulation, which encods the facial attributes into latent space. Furthermore, the researcher extent the image expression manipulation into video level called facial animation. Given a driving video and a source face image, the animation methods would generate a new video that the source image is performing the same expression and action as the face in the driving video. Thies et al. [24] consider facial reenactment as a domain transfer problem using Pix2Pix architecture [6] to produce such results. Siarohin et al. [22] extract the motion information of driving videos with optimal flow estimation to generate high-quality animation results.

**DeepFake Detection and Defense** As a response to the increasing generation quality of DeepFake, many methods are proposed to detect to defense DeepFake attacks. A common way is to develop DNN detection modules. Rossler [19]

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216 and Selim<sup>1</sup> implement DNN to achieve promising detec-217 tion accuracy. Others try to detect the inconsistency within 218 the generated data, such as detecting the identity swap-219 ping boundary, the inconsistent angles between the face and 220 head, and the difference between face and background [13]. 221 In addition, some researchers argue it contains synthesis 222 signals for the GAN-based DeepFake generation method. 223 Utilizing these signals could detect the forgery data easily. 224 For instance, Wang et al. [25] observe GAN signatures us-225 ing Discrete Cosine Transform(DCT) for detecting GAN-226 based DeepFake samples. Most of the proposed methods 227 focus on image/video-frame level detection, while some 228 video level detection methods are also introduced. [5] pro-229 posed a method to leverage Recurrent Neural Networks for 230 extracting temporal differences. Wang et al. [27] use 3D-231 CNN to utilize temporal information for detection. 232

#### 3. Methodology

In this section, we will first provide the preliminaries on Adversarial Attacks to DeepFake and then describe our proposed pipeline and optimization algorithm.

#### 3.1. Adversarial Attacks to DeepFake

As a new way for DeepFake defence, disrupting Deep-Fake models is to add human-imperceptible perturbations on the source images [21]. The disruption on the output fake images can be taken as an adversarial attack to the DeepFake model and will make the DeepFake models less effective in generating realistic images. That is, the output by DeepFake will be highly unrealistic from the perspective of human naked eyes. Formally, we denote x as the source image, and  $\hat{x}$  represents the adversarial input, i.e.,  $\hat{x} = x + \eta$ , where  $\eta$  is the human-imperceptible perturbation with a common norm constraint  $\|\eta\|_2 \leq \epsilon$ . Suppose there is a DeepFake generator  $G(\cdot)$ . By taking the source image x, and the perturbed image  $\hat{x}$  as the input, the Deep-Fake generator will produce G(x) and  $G(\hat{x})$ , respectively. A successful DeepFake disruption  $\eta$  on x will make the human observers easily notice that the generated  $G(\hat{x})$  is an image after manipulations. By considering r as an attacking target, the objective function can be written as

$$\max_{\eta} L_D(G(x+\eta), r), \quad \text{s.t.} \quad ||\eta||_2 \le \epsilon, \qquad (1)$$

where  $L_D$  is a distance function normally using the  $L^0$ ,  $L^2$ or  $L^\infty$  norms. If r is set to be the original DeepFake output, which is r = G(x), we will get the ideal disruption that can maximize the distortion of the output. Eq. (1) can be further generalized to consider the conditional image generation, i.e., G(x, c), where c denotes the target class. Moreover, we can also choose  $r_{target}$  to be a specific predefined image as the attacking target.

The optimal perturbation  $\eta$  for the source image x in Eq. (1) can be effectively optimized with those methods developed for generating adversarial examples, e.g., Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method (IFGSM) [4] or Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [12]. Though the optimal  $\eta$  can be effectively solved through the iterations of IFGSM or PGD, it could be time-consuming to deal with the large-scale image dataset. For each source image x, we have to run a separate optimization procedure to discover its corresponding optimal perturbation  $\eta$ . Most importantly, source images in the same dataset often have shared low-level or high-level patterns. The separate optimization of the perturbation for these images thus cannot well exploit the useful structure information in the dataset.

In the real-world multi-media systems, it is extremely expensive to employ human observers to defend the Deep-Fake by manually examining every input image in the large volume of vision data, even though the defects in the image produced by DeepFake are obvious. Instead, to automate the defense of DeepFake, it is prevalent to develop Deep-Fake detectors. Both DeepFake detectors and disrupting DeepFake are to defend DeepFake but from two different perspectives. The remaining question is whether the human perceptible images produced by disrupting DeepFake will indeed benefit the future DeepFake detection, rather than doing a disservice.

#### 3.2. DeepFake Disrupter

The model pipeline of our proposed method consists of Perturbation Generator, DeepFake Generator, and Deep-Fake Detector. Next, we will introduce them one by one followed by an overall optimization framework.

Instead of independently treating the perturbations on the source images, we tend to learn a disrupter to generate the perturbation P(x) for the image x. Hence, given a Deep-Fake generator G, the generated images for the source image x and perturbed image x + P(x) can be written as G(x) and G(x + P(x)), respectively. The objective function of disrupting DeepFake can thus be rewritten as

$$\max_{P} \quad \mathbb{E}_{x}[L_{D}(G(x+P(x)), r)], \quad \text{s.t.} \quad ||P(x)||_{2} \le \epsilon \quad \forall x,$$
(2)

where we have calculated distance loss function over all images in the training set. As the inequality constraint in Eq. (2) cannot be conveniently handled in the end-to-end training of the networks, we further have a soft constrained version of the objective function,

$$\max_{P} \quad \mathbb{E}_{x} \left[ L_{D}(G(x+P(x)), r) \right] - C_{1} \mathbb{E}_{x} \left[ (\|P(x)\|_{2} - \epsilon)_{+} \right],$$
(3)

where  $(\cdot)_+$  denotes the hinge loss,  $\epsilon$  is a small constant to constrain  $||P(x)||_2$ , and  $C_1$  is a hyper parameter to balance



Figure 2. Overview of DeepFake disrupter. A source video or image will firstly feed into the perturbation generator to produce a humanimperceptible perturbation. The perturbation will be added back to the source inputs. After that, we pass the adversarial inputs into the DeepFake Generator together with a target condition to get a fake image or fake video. Lastly, the fake outputs and the adversarial inputs will be fed into the downstream DeepFake discriminator model.

the two items. We will have a non-zero loss for the second item when  $||P(x)||_2 > \epsilon$ , which encourages that the generated perturbation will not be too severe on the source image.

Along with the development of advanced DeepFake manipulation methods, there also emerge a few effective Deep-Fake detection techniques. These DeepFake detection techniques are essential to screen the DeepFake data for the multimedia systems, while the aforementioned disrupting DeepFake is an preventive measure to protect the data from the DeepFake. But a safe DeepFake disrupter should take the downstream DeepFake detector into consideration. As the proposed work is not focusing on developing a new DeepFake detector, we directly adopt a well-trained Deep-Fake detector *D* as an auxiliary for the DeepFake disrupter. The detector actually considers a binary classification task,

$$D(x) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } x \text{ is real} \\ 0, & \text{if } x \text{ is } fake \end{cases},$$
(4)

where D denotes the DeepFake detector model, x is the input data to be examined by the detector. If the values of model output logits is over 0.5, we classify the input to be real; otherwise, we classify the input as fake.

The DeepFake detector D can well recognize that the clean source image x is real. A DeepFake generator Gmight generate the image G(x) that deceives the DeepFake detector D. But with the DeepFake disrupter P, we expect the generated fake image G(x + P(x)) could be well identified by D. That is, we aim to minimize the predicted logits for the fake data G(x + P(x)),

$$\mathcal{L}_{fake} = \mathbb{E}_x[D(G(x + P(x)))], \tag{5}$$

where  $\mathcal{L}_{fake}$  is thus denoted as the DeepFake detection loss for the fake data. It is instructive to note that the aim of disrupting Deep-Fake is to protect the data from DeepFake, rather than hurting the quality of the data. We have already constrained that the perturbation P(x) will not be too large by penalizing its norm. Here from the lens of the DeepFake detection, we introduce another quality measure of the perturbed data. If the perturbed data x + P(x) can still be recognized as real by the DeepFake detector D, we think its quality can be guaranteed to some extend. Formally, we obtain the detection loss for the perturbed data x + P(x),

$$\mathcal{L}_{real} = \mathbb{E}_x[1 - D(x + P(x))]. \tag{6}$$

By incorporating Eq. (3) and the above loss functions, we thus achieve the resulting objective function,

$$\mathcal{L} = -\mathbb{E}_x \left[ L_D(G(x+P(x)),r) \right] + C_1 \mathbb{E}_x \left[ (\|P(x)\|_2 - \epsilon)_+ \right] + C_2 \mathbb{E}_x [D(G(x+P(x)))] + C_3 \mathbb{E}_x [1 - D(x+P(x))],$$
(7)

where  $C_1$ ,  $C_2$  and  $C_3$  are hyper parameters to balance different loss items. The DeepFake Generator and Deep-Fake Detector will be pretrianed or selected from pretrained SOTA models and during training their parameters will be freezed, which means only the parameter of our proposed Perturbation Generator will be updated. The setting of of the hyper parameters and other training details like the structure of perturbation generators will be discussed in Appendix. By optimizing Eq. (7), an effective disrupter can be learned from the training dataset. At the inference stage, we can feed new images into the disrupter P and conduct efficient feed-forward processes to generate their corresponding optimal perturbation. The generated perturbation can increase the difficulty of the DeepFake methods in generating effective fake images to deceive humans' eyes and the downstream DeepFake detectors.

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432 **Generalization over** D. In the real world, the DeepFake 433 Disrupter P and D are in the same camp to defend the attack 434 by DeepFake Generator G. Both P and D are thus proba-435 bly trained and maintained by the same developer. That is 436 to say, when we are training disrupter P, we could have al-437 ready known and got the access to the detector D that is to 438 be used online. This thus naturally addresses the concern 439 on the generalization over D. Nevertheless, we also evalu-440 ate the generalization over different Ds' in our experiments, 441 e.g., training with an Xception-based D while testing on a 442 Resnet-based D. Although the overall detection accuracy 443 will drop, an image with the optimized perturbation tend to 444 be more easily identified than the clean one without protec-445 tion. 446

Generalization over G. The generalization over Deep-447 Fake Generator G manifests in two aspects. First, well-448 trained perturbation P generalizes well across different 449 DeepFake Generators G evaluated by the percentage of suc-450 cessfully disrupted images. e.g. trained by using GANi-451 mation and tested by using StarGAN. This is because most 452 DeepFake Generators are adversarially vulnerable to per-453 turbations. A tiny change to the input could easily distort 454 the output. Second, many DeepFake Generators are con-455 trolled by different conditions to generate specific fake im-456 ages. The well-trained perturbation shows a good gener-457 alization property across different conditions. e.g. trained 458 under blackhair condition and tested under brownhair con-459 dition in StarGAN. The detection accuracy for these cross-460 condition evaluations is higher than the clean image without 461 protection. 462

#### 4. Experiment

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This section illustrates the experimental results to demonstrate the effectiveness of DeepFake Disrupter using our proposed optimizing framework. We will firstly describe the datasets we used in our experiments. Then we will briefly discuss the baseline and evaluation metrics we used. Lastly, we will discuss our experimental results in detail.

#### 4.1. Datasets

We mainly use two datasets in our experiments: CelebA 474 475 [11] and VoxCeleb1 [14]. The Large-scale CelebFaces At-476 tributes Dataset (CelebA) has more than 200k celebrity images. In addition, this dataset covers large pose variations 477 and background clutter with 10,177 identities, 202,599 face 478 479 images, and 5 landmark locations, 40 binary attributes an-480 notations per image. The VoxCeleb1 dataset contains more than 100,000 videos extracted from Youtube, which are ut-481 terances of more than 1,000 celebrities. For the preprocess-482 ing of these videos, we follow the guideline and implemen-483 484 tation details of [22] to crop the video frames according to 485 annotated bounding boxes because the cropping process can

provide better alignment for DeepFake generator to produce good quality fake videos. After that, we recorded five different motion videos as the driving videos that serve as an input of the DeepFake Generator, namely mouth, blink, yaw, nod, smile. Then, we follow the official implementation of [22], for each video, we extract the best frame and together with a random driving video as the input pairs for the selected DeepFake Generator.

#### 4.2. Baseline and Evaluation Metrics

We use Disrupting DeepFakes proposed by [20] as our baseline. This work disrupts the DeepFake generation process by making the DeepFake Generator produce distorted images using the loss function same with Eq. 1, which is trying to make the DeepFake results visually unnatural. It is different from our method which is disrupting Deep-Fake generation by significantly reducing its passing rate on DeepFake detectors. We will empirically demonstrate that just making the DeepFake generator produce fake images with human-perceptible distortions doesn't necessarily guarantee that the fake videos will be recognized by Deep-Fake Detectors. To be specific, we will use Precision, Recall and F1 score to quantify the disrupting performance for both the baseline method and our proposed method. For evaluation on the successful disruptions by human eye, we follow [20] to set per-pixel errors  $L_2 \ge 0.05$  as our criteria. If the fake outputs of our method and the original fake outputs have  $L_2 \ge 0.05$ , we consider it a successful disruption visually.

#### 4.3. Results

Disruption Performance for specific target domains In this section, we use StarGAN to demonstrate that our proposed method can work on any specific target domains i.e. Black Hair, Blond Hair, Brown Hair, Male, Young. Here, target domain refers to c in conditional image translation model G(x, c). The comparison comes from three parts. The first part is original fake images produced under [3], the second part is disrupted fake images generated under [20], the third part is fake images generated under our proposed framework. Specifically, we choose 100 real images to generate 100 fake images according to the aforementioned three-generation processes to conduct the comparison. That is to say, we calculate the precision, recall, and F1 score using the 100 real images plus 100 fake images for comparison, in which the higher the precision, recall, and F1 score, the better the algorithm. Because all detectors are well pretrained and thus have high accuracy on predicting real images, the case of false negative is rare, resulting in high recall in all cases. Therefore, in the following experiments, we mainly focus on analyzing the performance change on precision and F1-score. Table 1 shows the detailed comparisons under different target settings. Notice that we choose

Attributes	Type		Xception	l	1	Resnet18	3	1	Resnet50	)
Attributes Blackhair Blondhair Brownhair male	Type	precision	recall	F1-score	precision	recall	F1-score	precision	recall	F1-score
	StarGAN-fake [3]	0.51	0.99	0.68	0.39	0.60	0.47	0.43	0.75	0.55
D1 11 1	disrupted-fake [20]	0.53	0.99	0.69	0.50	0.60	0.55	0.46	0.75	0.57
Blackhair	DeepFake disrupter(ours)	0.90	0.99	0.94	1.00	0.60	0.75	0.94	0.75	0.83
	StarGAN-fake [3]	0.51	0.99	0.67	0.38	0.60	0.46	0.43	0.75	0.55
Blondhair	disrupted-fake [20]	0.55	0.99	0.71	0.52	0.60	0.56	0.56	0.75	0.64
	DeepFake disrupter(ours)	0.98	0.99	0.99	1.00	0.60	0.75	0.99	0.75	0.85
	StarGAN-fake [3]	0.51	0.99	0.68	0.38	0.60	0.47	0.43	0.75	0.55
Daorrahaia	disrupted-fake [20]	0.56	0.99	0.71	0.49	0.60	0.54	0.46	0.75	0.57
Brownhair	DeepFake disrupter(ours)	0.96	0.99	0.98	0.75	0.60	0.67	0.54	0.75	0.63
	StarGAN-fake [3]	0.51	0.99	0.68	0.39	0.60	0.47	0.43	0.75	0.55
male	disrupted-fake [20]	0.54	0.99	0.70	0.42	0.60	0.49	0.51	0.75	0.61
	DeepFake disrupter(ours)	0.97	0.99	0.98	1.00	0.60	0.75	0.98	0.75	0.85
	StarGAN-fake [3]	0.51	0.99	0.67	0.38	0.60	0.47	0.43	0.75	0.54
	disrupted-fake [20]	0.53	0.99	0.69	0.48	0.60	0.53	0.51	0.75	0.61
young	DeepFake disrupter(ours)	0.90	0.99	0.95	1.00	0.60	0.75	0.83	0.75	0.79

Table 1. Disruption Performance for StarGAN with 5 different target conditions. Higher figure implies better performance

DeepFake Detector	Xception			Resnet18			Resnet50		
Deepi uke Dettettoi	precision	recall	F1-score	precision	recall	F1-score	precision	recall	F1-score
StarGAN [3]	0.58	0.99	0.72	0.53	0.60	0.56	0.56	0.75	0.64
Disrupring StarGAN [20]	0.64	0.99	0.78	0.59	0.60	0.60	0.59	0.75	0.66
DeepFake disrupter (ours)	0.86	0.99	0.92	0.87	0.60	0.71	0.72	0.75	0.74
GANimation [18]	0.60	0.97	0.74	0.47	0.65	0.55	0.53	0.78	0.63
Disrupting GANimation [20]	0.70	0.97	0.82	0.56	0.65	0.60	0.67	0.78	0.72
DeepFake disrupter (ours)	0.82	0.97	0.89	0.89	0.65	0.75	0.98	0.78	0.87
First-Order-Motion [22]	0.56	0.72	0.63	0.50	0.68	0.58	-	-	-
DeepFake disrupter (ours)	0.91	0.72	0.80	0.89	0.68	0.78	-	-	-

Table 2. Disruption Performance under different DeepFake Manipulation Models and DeepFake Detection Models

the same set of real images for a fair comparison, therefore, the recall score will only change based on different detection models. In most cases, baseline method [20] can only archive 2 - 10% performance gain with regarding to precision and F1 score, while our method can boost the performance to more than 90%.

**Disruption Performance for class transferable attacks** The DeepFake architectures used in our framework all have conditional targets as their inputs. StarGAN has facial at-tribute encodings; GANimation has action units for differ-ent expressions and the First-Order Motion model has dif-ferent kinds of driving videos. It is beneficial to train a perturbation generator that can work under arbitrary target conditions. The training strategy is simple, we choose con-ditional targets randomly during each training iteration, i.e., at each iteration, we choose random action unit index from the range between 0 to 80 when training our Perturbation generator under the GANimation setting. The trained per-turbation generator would be enabled to produce perturba-tions that can satisfy our problem constraints. We tested the performance of the aforementioned three DeepFake manip-ulation algorithms using the pretrained DeepFake detection models via precision, recall and, F1 score. For First Order Motion Model [22], we didn't use Resnet50 for detection testing due to VRAM budget limitation. As there is no pre-

vious work for disrupting the outcomes of the First-Order-Motion model, we directly use its original fake videos as our baseline. Table 2 shows the detailed comparisons, and from the table, we can see that our proposed framework not only works on image transformation algorithms like Star-GAN [3] and GANimation [18] but also works on face image animation algorithms First-Order-Motion Model [22], and they all show superior performance compared with simply maximizing output norm distances in baseline method.

DeepFake Detector	Multi-Attentional [30]				
	precision	recall	F1-score		
StarGAN [3]	0.53	0.98	0.69		
Disrupring StarGAN [20]	0.67	0.98	0.77		
DeepFake disrupter (ours)	0.88	0.98	0.93		
GANimation [18]	0.62	0.96	0.75		
Disrupting GANimation [20]	0.73	0.96	0.84		
DeepFake disrupter (ours)	0.85	0.96	0.91		

Table 3. Disruption Performance Against Multi-Attentional Deepfake Detection models

**Disruption Performance with SOTA DeepFake Detection Algorithms** We use basic backbones like Xception and Resnet in the above experiments simply because we aim to prove the effectiveness of our trained perturbation genera-

tor. However, we also tested our proposed pipeline against state-of-the-art DeepFake detection algorithms called multi-attentional DeepFake Detection [30]. In their work, they utilize multi attentional maps and textural feature enhance-ment to boost the detection performance and we will use their pretrained models as our DeepFake detector in our proposed pipeline. From Table 3 we can see our proposed pipeline can achieve similar performance gain in terms of precision and F1-score compared with those using Xcep-tion and Resnet, which further proves the efficacy of our proposed pipeline. 

**Detection Outcomes for Real Inputs, Perturbed Inputs** and Fake Inputs We compare the detection outcomes of real inputs, perturbed real inputs, and fake inputs using our proposed method because one goal of our proposed frame-work is ensuring the perturbed real inputs to be detected as real by the DeepFake detectors. To be specific, we add perturbations generated by the proposed method to 100 test-ing real images to get 100 perturbed real images for testing under pretrained Xception and Resnet18 detector. Table 4 shows the success rate, i.e., the proportion of images that can be detected as real by the detectors. For real inputs xand perturbed real inputs x + P(x), the higher the success rate the better, for fake inputs G[x + P(x)] the lower the success rate the better. From the table, we can see that the real inputs and perturbed input can all maintain a high suc-cess rate while the fake inputs successfully achieve a lower success rate. 

Face Manipulation	Inputs Type	Xception	Resnet18
	x	0.99	0.98
StarGAN	x + P(x)	0.98	0.96
	G[x+P(x)]	0.10	0.07
	x	0.99	0.97
GANimation	x + P(x)	0.98	0.96
	G[x+P(x)]	0.03	0.09
	x	0.99	0.97
First-Order-Motion	x + P(x)	0.98	0.96
	G[x+P(x)]	0.13	0.16

Table 4. Detection outcomes for comparison among real inputs, perturbed inputs and fake inputs.

Generalization This section explores the generalization ability of the trained perturbation generator from two aspects: detector and manipulation generator. We test the disruption performance by using a detector that is differ-ent from that in the training. F1 scores are reported in Table 5, where the generator is GANimation. The manipulations G(x) over clean images can be only detected by Resnet18 with a 0.55 F1. By incorporating the downstream Resnet18 detector into the proposed algorithm, the F1 by Resnet18 can achieve 0.75, and other unknown detectors like Xcep-tion and Resnet50 can also enjoy higher F1 scores than 0.55, which demonstrates the generalization with respect to the detector.

Detectors	Xception	Resnet18	Resnet50	G(x)
Xception	0.89	0.77	0.68	0.74
Resnet18	0.61	0.75	0.64	0.55
Resnet50	0.74	0.79	0.87	0.63

 Table 5. Generalization w.r.t. different detectors

We proceed to evaluate the generalization w.r.t. different manipulations. StarGAN is used in training, while GANimation is used in tests, and vice versa. The distortion of DeepFake outcomes is reported in Table 6.  $L_2$  norm is calculated between manipulation of the clean image and that of the clean image with our perturbations, i.e., G(x) and G(x+P(x)). Following [20], %*dis* shows percentage of successful disruptions of 500 fake images produced by G(x+P(x)), ie. when L2 is over 0.05, the image is successfully disrupted. Conducting both training and test with Star-GAN leads to a 100% success. Though the test on a different GANimation has a performance drop, the success rate of 74% is still high enough. When training with GANimation, we find that StarGAN is more vulnerable, as its success rate achieves 100%.

<b>Face Manimulation</b>	Star	GAN	GANimation		
Face Manipulation	L2	%dis	L2	%dis	
StarGAN	0.326	100%	0.183	74%	
GANimation	0.987	100%	0.073	82%	

Table 6. L2 Norm and Percentage of Disruption trained and tested with different generators.

StarGAN depends on the manipulation conditions. The condition set in the training could be different from that in the testing. We evaluate the generalization results of different conditions in Table 7. The results are F1-scores tested by Xception Detector. Baseline is detection results of G(x) over clean images. By considering the condition Blackhair, the detector can achieve a 0.68 F1 over the fake results of clean images, while the proposed algorithm can protect the data and the detector's performance is boosted to the 0.94 F1. Though changing a different condition (Blondhair or Brownhair) in the test leads to a performance drop, the resulting detection performance is still higher than that without protection (i.e., 0.68). This thus suggests the generalization of the manipulation generator.

Conditions	Blackhair	Blondhair	Brownhair	G(x)
Blackhair	0.94	0.79	0.81	0.68
Blondhair	0.73	0.99	0.70	0.67
Brownhair	0.69	0.74	0.98	0.68

Table 7. Generalization to different conditions in StarGAN reported by F1-score

DeepFake Visualization In this section, we will show that



Figure 3. Comparison between the result of our framework and baseline methods.

the DeepFake outputs have a high probability of being distorted from the perspective of the human eye. Figure 3 shows the visualization comparison of our method with the baseline method on StarGAN and GANimation. We can see that the patterns of disrupted outcome vary across different attacking methods and DeepFake manipulation models, but they all show noticeable distortions compared with the fake images without disruption. Figure 4 shows visualizations on video frames under [22]. The first row is the original video frames. The second row is fake videos produced by using original videos as a source. The third row is original videos adding perturbations generated by our trained perturbation generator. The last row is the fake videos produced by perturbed frames. We can see that the disrupted fake video frames in the last row all have significant noises or distortions. Apart from qualitatively visualizing the DeepFake outcomes, we also evaluate the proportions of disrupted outcomes quantitatively. We follow [29] to set  $L_2 \ge 0.05$  as the criteria for successful disruption as there are noticeable distortions when  $L_2 \ge 0.05$ . Table 8 shows the per-pixel  $L_2$  for generated perturbations  $\eta$  and the difference between disrupted fake images and original fake images as well as the percentage of successful disruptions under different at-tack methods. 

Algorithm	Туре	StarGAN	GANimation	First-Order-Motion
LEGSM	$L_2$	1.324	0.120	0.240
1-1 0.5.01	% dis	100%	89%	92%
PGD	$L_2$	1.532	0.064	0.280
TOD	% dis	100%	79%	100%
dismuntan (Ours)	$L_2$	0.326	0.073	0.320
uisi upter (Ours)	% dis	100%	82%	91%

Table 8. Comparison of  $L_2$  pixel-wise errors and the percentage of disrupted images(%dis.) for baseline disruption methods and our method.

Inference Efficiency We also compare the inference effi-ciency between the baseline method [20] and our proposed Disrupter. Specifically, we choose 100 testing images to run the inference using the PGD method and Our Disrupter and calculate the average time of generating perturbation for a



Figure 4. Examples of visualizations on First Order Motion Model with and without perturbations.

single input image measured by seconds. Table 9 shows that our proposed method disrupter runs 8-10 times faster compared with the traditional iteration-based attack method PGD.

Attack Method	PGD	Disrupter (ours)
StarGAN	0.551	0.062
GANimation	0.628	0.057

Table 9. Inference Efficiency measured by seconds per image

#### 5. Conclusion

We propose an effective pipeline called DeepFake Disrupter based on generative networks to train perturbation generators that can help protect the source images or videos from being manipulated by various DeepFake manipulation algorithms. By adding adversarial perturbations, the Deep-Fake models would output fake images or videos to be successfully detected as fake by the DeepFake detector. Meanwhile, the adversarial images would still be detected as real by the DeepFake detector. The objective is achieved by adversarial loss and hinge loss, the former one controls the detection accuracy, while the latter controls the magnitude of the perturbations. Experiments show that (a) the baseline method [20] can only ensure the effectiveness of disruption by the naked eye, but failed to guarantee that the disrupted outputs can be effectively detected as fake by DeepFake detectors. (b). The proposed method can significantly improve the detection outcomes measured by precision, recall, and F1 score compared with the baseline method, and this performance is class transferable when training with random class attributes. (c) The proposed method also provides an extra benefit, which is maintaining the unnatural-looking property of the fake outcomes. That is to say, our proposed pipeline can destroy the ability of DeepFake manipulation models both visually by the human eye and logically by DeepFake detectors.

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